Schneider Electric Software Update (SESU)
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- CVSS v3 7.8
- ATTENTION: Low skill level to exploit
- Vendor: Schneider Electric
- Equipment: Software Update (SESU)
- Vulnerability: DLL hijacking
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target system.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
Schneider Electric reports that the vulnerability affects the following Software Update products:
- Schneider Electric Software Update (SESU), all versions prior to v2.2.0
Schneider Electric Software Update (SESU) is installed by the following Schneider Electric software:
- Acti 9 Smart Test
- CompactNSX Firmware Update
- Ecodial Advance Calculation
- Ecoreach Software
- EcoStruxure Modicon Builder
- eXLhoist Configuration Software
- Lexium 26 DTM Library
- Lexium 28 DTM Library
- Lexium 32 DTM Library
- LV Motor Starter
- PowerSCADA Expert
- Schneider Electric Floating License Manager
- Schneider Electric License Manager
- Schneider Electric Motion Sizer
- Schneider Electric SQL Gateway
- SoMachine Basic
- SoMachine Motion Software
- SoMachine Motion Tools v4.3
- SoMachine Software
- SoSafe Configurable
- SoSafe Programmable v2.1
- Unity Loader
- Unity Pro
- Vijeo Citect
- Vijeo Designer
- Vijeo Designer Opti 6.1
- Vijeo XD
- Web Gate Client Files
3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
The product uses a fixed or controlled search path to find resources. An attacker with local access could place a specially crafted file on the target machine, which may give the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code.
- CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy
- COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
- COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: France
ADLab of Venustech reported this vulnerability to NCCIC.
Schneider Electric has created a fix for this vulnerability (Version 2.2.0) which is available at the following location:
Schneider Electric recommends following industry cybersecurity best practices such as:
- Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
- Physical controls should be in place so that no unauthorized person would have access to the ICS and safety controllers, peripheral equipment or the ICS and safety networks.
All controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the “Program” mode.
- All programming software should be kept in locked cabinets and should never be connected to any network other than the network for the devices that it is intended.
- All methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. should be scanned before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks.
- Laptops that have connected to any other network besides the intended network should never be allowed to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation.
- Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
- When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.